Good afternoon, everyone. Imagine your first job gives you a form about a retirement savings plan. Do you join or not? Most of us think we would decide carefully. But economists have found something surprising: very often, the box that is already ticked decides for us. Today I'll talk about this "default effect." First, I'll explain what a default is. Then I'll show you three real cases: one company in the United States, one clever savings plan, and a whole country, the United Kingdom. Finally, I'll look at the main criticism and give my view.
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Good afternoon, everyone. Imagine your first job gives you a form about a retirement savings plan. Do you join or not? Most of us think we would decide carefully. But economists have found something surprising: very often, the box that is already ticked decides for us. Today I'll talk about this "default effect." First, I'll explain what a default is. Then I'll show you three real cases: one company in the United States, one clever savings plan, and a whole country, the United Kingdom. Finally, I'll look at the main criticism and give my view.
Let's start with the basic idea. A default is what happens if you do nothing. Economists call our habit of staying with it "inertia." I noticed this in my own life. When I opened my first bank account, the app asked if I wanted to save a small amount every time I used my card. The box was already ticked. I never changed it, and after a year, I had more savings than I expected. I didn't make a smart decision. I simply didn't make a decision at all. Now, is this just my story, or does it happen on a large scale?
My first case comes from a famous 2001 study by Brigitte Madrian and Dennis Shea, published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. They studied a large American company that changed one rule in its 401(k), a retirement savings plan. Before the change, workers had to sign up. After the change, new workers were enrolled automatically, but they could leave at any time. The result was dramatic. Among workers with a similar time at the company, only 37% of those hired under the old rule had joined. Under the new rule, 86% were in the plan. The choices were the same. Only the default changed.
Source: Madrian, B. C., & Shea, D. F. (2001). "The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1149–1187 (NBER Working Paper 7682): 401(k) participation at 3–15 months of tenure was 37% for employees hired before automatic enrollment (WINDOW cohort) vs. 86% for those hired under automatic enrollment (NEW cohort)
However, the same study also found a problem. The automatic plan saved 3% of each worker's pay in a money market fund, which is very safe but grows slowly. According to the study, 61% of the new workers stayed exactly there: 3%, all in that one fund. They did not choose it. They just never changed it. Workers hired earlier, who had chosen for themselves, put roughly 70% of their contributions into stock funds. In other words, the default pulled many people in, but it also held them at a low level. This tells us something important: a default is not neutral.
Source: Madrian, B. C., & Shea, D. F. (2001). "The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1149–1187 (NBER Working Paper 7682): default was a 3% contribution rate, 100% in the money market fund; 61% of the NEW cohort were at this default; the other cohorts allocated roughly 70% of their contributions to stock funds
So, can we design a better default? My second case says yes. Economists Richard Thaler and Shlomo Benartzi created a plan called "Save More Tomorrow." The idea is simple. People don't promise to save more today. They promise to save more from their next pay raise. Because the money comes from future raises, it doesn't feel like a loss. According to their 2004 paper in the Journal of Political Economy, 78% of the workers who were offered the plan joined. Over 40 months, their average saving rate rose from 3.5% to 13.6%. This shows that a default can be designed to go up, not stay low.
Source: Thaler, R. H., & Benartzi, S. (2004). "Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving." Journal of Political Economy, 112(S1), S164–S187: 78% of those offered the plan joined; average saving rates of participants increased from 3.5% to 13.6% over 40 months
Now, let's look at a whole country. In 2012, the United Kingdom began automatic enrolment into workplace pensions. Employers must sign up eligible workers, and workers can still opt out if they want. According to the UK Department for Work and Pensions, the share of eligible employees saving in a workplace pension had fallen to a low of 55% in 2012. By 2024, it was 89%. That is a huge change, and nobody was forced to stay. In my view, this is the strongest evidence of the three, because it worked for a whole nation, not just one company, and the effect has lasted for more than ten years.
Sources: UK Department for Work and Pensions (2016), "Workplace pension participation and saving trends of eligible employees: 2005 to 2015": automatic enrolment commenced in 2012; participation fell to a low of 55% (10.7 million eligible employees) in 2012; UK Department for Work and Pensions, "Workplace pension participation and savings trends of eligible employees: 2009 to 2024": around 9-in-10 (89%) of eligible employees in Great Britain were saving into a workplace pension in 2024
Of course, some people criticize this idea. The strongest criticism is that defaults are a kind of manipulation. If governments and companies can push us without our noticing, they could also push us in bad directions, for example into expensive products. That's fair, and the 3% problem from the first study shows that the risk is real. But I don't think the answer is to remove defaults. Every form has a default, even if it is "not enrolled." The real question is who sets it, and how. In my view, a good default should meet three conditions. It's easy to leave, it's clearly explained, and it's reviewed when the evidence changes.
Source: Madrian, B. C., & Shea, D. F. (2001). "The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1149–1187: 61% of employees hired under automatic enrollment stayed at the 3% default contribution rate in the money market fund
To sum up, defaults are powerful because most of us do nothing. One American company raised participation from 37% to 86% just by changing the default. Save More Tomorrow showed that defaults can be designed to grow. And the UK showed that it works for a whole country. The lesson for me is simple. Before you click "next" on any form, look for the box that is already ticked. Someone chose it for you. Thank you for listening. I'm happy to take your questions.
Sources: Madrian, B. C., & Shea, D. F. (2001). "The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1149–1187: 37% vs. 86% participation; Thaler, R. H., & Benartzi, S. (2004). "Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving." Journal of Political Economy, 112(S1), S164–S187; UK Department for Work and Pensions: eligible employee workplace pension participation 55% (2012) and 89% (2024)
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